

JANE LINDA VAN ZUTPHEN,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
ANDREW SAUL,<sup>1</sup>  
Defendant.

Case No. [18-cv-00057-SI](#)

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND  
DENYING IN PART CROSS-MOTIONS  
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;  
REMANDED FOR FURTHER  
PROCEEDINGS**

Re: Dkt. Nos. 23, 34

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment in this Social Security appeal. Upon review of the parties' papers and the administrative record ("AR"), the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff's motion and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant's cross-motion. The matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.

**BACKGROUND**

By the time of the first administrative hearing on July 23, 2014, plaintiff Jane Linda Van Zutphen was a fifty-seven-year-old woman with a high school education. AR 27. Her work experience includes employment as a part-time ticket seller for the Giants. *Id.* at 1040. Plaintiff's disability traces back to "five automobile accidents and . . . a work injury in 1993." *Id.* at 136. According to a Function Report that plaintiff completed on March 19, 1997, she sustained neck, back, and leg injuries through "several consecutive automobile accidents." *Id.* at 119. Her back and leg injuries were aggravated by her then employer who refused to decrease her work hours or

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for his predecessor, Nancy A. Berryhill, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

1 workload. *Id.* In 1997, she reported having a “back and neck problem which radiates pain through  
2 the back and legs.” *Id.* at 78. Plaintiff reported at that time that she was “unable to stand, sit, walk,  
3 lift, [or] bend without being in pain,” which prevented her from working. *Id.*

4 On March 11, 1999, plaintiff was found disabled as of August 26, 1994, and entitled to  
5 disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, due to “severe mental  
6 depression and physical pain.”<sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 22, 491. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that  
7 plaintiff met Medical Listing 12.04 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. *Id.* at 491. On  
8 October 30, 2006, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) found her disability to be continuing.  
9 *Id.* at 24, 496, 506. Plaintiff’s disability benefits continued until July 2009, when her benefits ceased  
10 due to work activity. *Id.* at 22, 671-72.

11 On October 26, 2011, plaintiff filed for expedited reinstatement of benefits and received  
12 provisional benefits. *Id.* at 512, 514. On March 5, 2012, the SSA determined that plaintiff was no  
13 longer disabled as of March 1, 2012. *Id.* at 497. Plaintiff filed for reconsideration and on July 16,  
14 2012, the SSA found that her disability had ceased as of October 1, 2011. *Id.* at 498.

15 Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. *Id.* at 537. Plaintiff’s hearing before ALJ  
16 Michael Blume was held on July 23, 2014. *Id.* at 22. The ALJ issued a decision on September 25,  
17 2014, finding that plaintiff was not disabled as of July 1, 2009. *Id.* at 19, 22. On April 13, 2015,  
18 the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. *Id.* at 12.

19 Plaintiff then filed an action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision  
20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the action was assigned to the undersigned Judge. *See Van*  
21 *Zutphen v. Colvin*, No. 15-cv-02429-SI (filed June 2, 2015). Both parties moved for summary  
22 judgment. AR at 1091-92. On September 26, 2016, this Court entered an order granting plaintiff’s  
23 motion for summary judgment and denying defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. *Id.*  
24 at 1090-1106; *see also Van Zutphen v. Colvin*, No. 15-cv-02429-SI, Dkt No. 20. The Court found  
25 that the ALJ committed legal error in finding medical improvement at step three of the continuing  
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27 <sup>2</sup> At the same time, plaintiff applied for and was found eligible for Supplemental Security  
28 Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. However, the SSI application is not  
part of the administrative record in this case, and those benefits are not the subject of the present  
appeal.

1 disability review because the ALJ's decision failed to compare any medical evidence that pre-dated  
2 the October 30, 2006 Comparison Point Decision ("CPD")<sup>3</sup> with current medical evidence and  
3 addressed only plaintiff's depression when the initial disability finding was based on depression and  
4 physical pain/fibromyalgia. *Id.* at 1097-1110. The Court also found that the ALJ failed to give clear  
5 and convincing reasons for discrediting plaintiff's testimony. *Id.* at 1100-04. The Court remanded  
6 the case for further proceedings. *Id.* at 1106.

7 The Appeals Council then vacated the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case to  
8 the ALJ for "the purpose of completing the record and holding a *de novo* hearing." *Id.* at 1113. The  
9 SSA notified plaintiff of a hearing to be held on September 6, 2017, and invited plaintiff to submit  
10 additional evidence in support of her claim. *Id.* at 1209-16. Plaintiff confirmed that she would  
11 attend the hearing. *Id.* at 1227. On September 6, 2017, ALJ Blume held a rehearing. Plaintiff failed  
12 to appear, although her non-attorney representative was present. *Id.* at 1066, 1322-24. On October  
13 16, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, again finding that plaintiff's disability ended as  
14 of July 1, 2009. *Id.* at 1062, 1086. The Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction and the ALJ's  
15 decision has become the final decision of the Commissioner after remand. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.984.

16 On January 4, 2018, plaintiff filed this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  
17 § 405(g). Dkt. No.1. The Court granted multiple requests for extensions of time to both parties.  
18 *See* Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, 29, 31, 33. Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, moves for summary  
19 judgment, asking this Court to reverse the ALJ's decision and remand the case to the Commissioner  
20 for reinstatement and calculation of past due benefits since July 1, 2009. Dkt. No. 23 ("Pl.'s Mot.").  
21 Defendant has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the ALJ's decision was  
22 supported by substantial evidence and asking that this Court affirm the ALJ's decision and deny  
23 plaintiff's request to reinstate benefits. Dkt. No. 34 ("Def's Cross-Mot."). Although the Court  
24 granted plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file a reply brief on June 20, 2019, plaintiff  
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26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>3</sup> The Comparison Point Decision as used here is the date of "the most recent favorable  
28 medical decision that [the claimant was] disabled or continued to be disabled." *See* 20 C.F.R.  
§ 404.1594(b)(1). The ALJ determined and the parties agree that the CPD in this case is October  
30, 2006, the date that plaintiff was most recently found to have a continuing disability. *See* AR  
506.

1 has filed no reply as of the date of this Order. *See* Dkt No. 36.

2

3 **LEGAL STANDARD**

4 **I. Standard of Review**

5 The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of final decisions made by the  
6 Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court's review of a disability determination is limited, and  
7 a final administrative decision may be altered "only if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings  
8 are not supported by substantial evidence." *Sprague v. Bowen*, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987).  
9 Substantial evidence is the relevant evidence in the entire record "which a reasonable person might  
10 accept as adequate to support a conclusion." *Vertigan v. Halter*, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.  
11 2001). Substantial evidence consists of "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance."  
12 *Young v. Sullivan*, 911 F.2d 181, 183 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts "must consider the entire record as a  
13 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the  
14 Commissioner's conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of  
15 supporting evidence." *Garrison v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Lingenfelter*  
16 *v. Astrue*, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)). "Where evidence is susceptible to more than one  
17 rational interpretation," the ALJ's decision should be upheld. *Burch v. Barnhart*, 400 F.3d 676, 679  
18 (9th Cir. 2005). The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review. *See Biestek*  
19 *v. Berryhill*, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

20 A district court may enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the  
21 Commissioner, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If  
22 additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a Social  
23 Security case should be remanded. *See Lewin v. Schweiker*, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). A  
24 decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless. *Burch*, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing  
25 *Curry v. Sullivan*, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)).

26

27 **II. Continuing Disability Review**

28 "Once a claimant has been found to be disabled, . . . a presumption of continuing disability

1 arises in her favor.” *Bellamy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.*, 755 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.  
2 1985) (citing *Murray v. Heckler*, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983)); *see also Medina v. Colvin*, No.  
3 14-CV-01967-DMR, 2015 WL 5448498, at \*12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (discussing the Ninth  
4 Circuit’s reaffirming this presumption after 1984 amendments to the Social Security Act). The  
5 Commissioner periodically reviews whether the claimant continues to be entitled to benefits. *See*  
6 42 U.S.C. § 423(f); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(a).

7 At continuing disability review, an ALJ conducts an eight-step inquiry:

- 8 (1) Are you engaging in substantial gainful activity? If you are (and any applicable  
9 trial work period has been completed), we will find disability to have ended (see  
paragraph (d)(5) of this section).
- 10 (2) If you are not, do you have an impairment or combination of impairments which  
11 meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in appendix 1 of this subpart? If  
you do, your disability will be found to continue.
- 12 (3) If you do not, has there been medical improvement as defined in paragraph (b)(1)  
13 of this section? If there has been medical improvement as shown by a decrease in  
medical severity, see step (4). If there has been no decrease in medical severity, there  
has been no medical improvement. (See step (5).)
- 14 (4) If there has been medical improvement, we must determine whether it is related  
15 to your ability to do work in accordance with paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this  
section; i.e., whether or not there has been an increase in the residual functional  
capacity based on the impairment(s) that was present at the time of the most recent  
favorable medical determination. If medical improvement is not related to your  
ability to do work, see step (5). If medical improvement is related to your ability to  
do work, see step (6).
- 16 (5) If we found at step (3) that there has been no medical improvement or if we found  
17 at step (4) that the medical improvement is not related to your ability to work, we  
consider whether any of the exceptions in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section apply.  
If none of them apply, your disability will be found to continue. If one of the first  
group of exceptions to medical improvement applies, see step (6). If an exception  
from the second group of exceptions to medical improvement applies, your disability  
will be found to have ended. The second group of exceptions to medical  
improvement may be considered at any point in this process.
- 18 (6) If medical improvement is shown to be related to your ability to do work or if one  
19 of the first group of exceptions to medical improvement applies, we will determine  
20 whether all your current impairments in combination are severe (see § 404.1521).  
This determination will consider all your current impairments and the impact of the  
combination of those impairments on your ability to function. If the residual  
functional capacity assessment in step (4) above shows significant limitation of your  
ability to do basic work activities, see step (7). When the evidence shows that all  
your current impairments in combination do not significantly limit your physical or  
mental abilities to do basic work activities, these impairments will not be considered  
severe in nature. If so, you will no longer be considered to be disabled.

1                             (7) If your impairment(s) is severe, we will assess your current ability to do  
2                             substantial gainful activity in accordance with § 404.1560. That is, we will assess  
3                             your residual functional capacity based on all your current impairments and consider  
4                             whether you can still do work you have done in the past. If you can do such work,  
5                             disability will be found to have ended.  
6

7                             (8) If you are not able to do work you have done in the past, we will consider whether  
8                             you can do other work given the residual functional capacity assessment made under  
9                             paragraph (f)(7) of this section and your age, education, and past work experience  
10                           (see paragraph (f)(9) of this section for an exception to this rule). If you can, we will  
11                           find that your disability has ended. If you cannot, we will find that your disability  
12                           continues.

13                           (9) We may proceed to the final step, described in paragraph (f)(8) of this section, if  
14                           the evidence in your file about your past relevant work is not sufficient for us to make  
15                           a finding under paragraph (f)(7) of this section about whether you can perform your  
16                           past relevant work. If we find that you can adjust to other work based solely on your  
17                           age, education, and residual functional capacity, we will find that you are no longer  
18                           disabled, and we will not make a finding about whether you can do your past relevant  
19                           work under paragraph (f)(7) of this section. If we find that you may be unable to  
20                           adjust to other work or if § 404.1562 may apply, we will assess your claim under  
21                           paragraph (f)(7) of this section and make a finding about whether you can perform  
22                           your past relevant work.  
23

24                           20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f).

### 15                           **ALJ DECISION**

16                           Following the rehearing directed by this Court, the ALJ applied the eight-step analysis  
17                           described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 regarding plaintiff's continuing disability status. AR 1067. At  
18                           step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity through July  
19                           1, 2009. *Id.* at 1068. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the medically determinable  
20                           impairments of supraventricular tachycardia ("SVT") and depressive disorder not otherwise  
21                           specified ("NOS") as of July 1, 2009, but that since July 1, 2009, plaintiff has not had an impairment  
22                           or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal a Listing. *Id.* at 1068-70. The ALJ  
23                           discussed the relevant medical record and concluded that "there is insufficient evidence to satisfy  
24                           [the criteria for Listing 4.05 (SVT)], or to establish that SVT, either alone or in combination with  
25                           another impairment, significantly limited plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities for a  
26                           period meeting the durational requirement of 20 CFR 404.1509." *Id.* at 1070. The ALJ also  
27                           concluded that plaintiff's medically determinable mental impairment did not meet the criteria of  
28                           paragraph A or paragraph B of Listing 12.04 (Depressive disorder). *Id.* at 1070-72. In finding

1 plaintiff's mental impairment failed to meet the criteria of Listing 12.04 paragraph B, the ALJ  
2 accorded significant weight to the assessments of the State agency psychological consultants and  
3 gave great weight to the opinion of consultative psychiatric examiner Dr. Arudra Bodepudi, M.D.  
4 *Id.* at 1071-72. The ALJ explained that Dr. Bodepudi's opinion was "the most complete and detailed  
5 psychiatric evaluation in the record" and was "consistent with the overall evidence." *Id.* at 1072.

6 At step three, the ALJ found that medical improvement occurred as of July 1, 2009. *Id.* at  
7 1073. The ALJ first discussed the medical evidence leading to the CPD on October 30, 2006. The  
8 ALJ then addressed post-CPD medical evidence leading to the finding of medical improvement with  
9 respect to plaintiff's depression and chronic pain.

10 At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff's "medical improvement is related to the ability to  
11 work because, as of July 1, 2009, [plaintiff] no longer had an impairment or combination of  
12 impairments that met or medically equaled the same listing that was met at the time of the CPD (20  
13 CFR 404.1594(c)(3)(i))."<sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 1082. Because of this finding at step four, the ALJ skipped to step  
14 six. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(4).

15 At step six, the ALJ found, in contrast to the previous decision, that plaintiff "did not have a  
16 severe impairment" as of July 1, 2009.<sup>5</sup> AR 1082. Although this finding should have ended the  
17 analysis of the continuing disability review, resulting in a finding that plaintiff's disability had  
18 ended, *see* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(6), the ALJ moved to the next step and discussed plaintiff's  
19 residual functional capacity ("RFC").

20 At step seven, the ALJ found that "[a]s of July 1, 2009, the claimant had the residual  
21 functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following  
22 nonexertional limitations: she should not be exposed to unprotected heights or to hazards such as

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23  
24 <sup>4</sup> 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(3)(i) states that, for claimants previously determined to be  
25 disabled because they met a Listing, where "medical improvement has occurred and the severity of  
26 the prior impairment(s) no longer meets or equals the same listing section used to make our most  
recent favorable decision, we will find that the medical improvement was related to your ability to  
work."

27 <sup>5</sup> In his decision on September 25, 2014, the ALJ found that as of July 1, 2009, plaintiff  
28 continued to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments as to her SVT, but that  
plaintiff's fibromyalgia or chronic pain syndrome, alleged neck pain and back pain, and depressive  
disorder NOS were non-severe. AR 25.

1 moving machinery.” AR 1082. Following the two-step process described at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529,  
2 the ALJ found that plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably have been  
3 expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however, her statements concerning the intensity,  
4 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms after the CPD are at times internally inconsistent,  
5 and inconsistent with other evidence of record.” *Id.* at 1084. In so finding, the ALJ gave significant  
6 weight to the opinion of cardiologist and medical expert Dr. Mitchell Collman, M.D., who testified  
7 at the July 2014 hearing. *Id.* Dr. Collman found that “there were no exertional limitations but that  
8 the claimant should be precluded from driving a bus, flying a plane, and being around dangerous  
9 machinery or unprotected heights.” *Id.* The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinion of consultative  
10 internist Dr. Farah M. Rana, M.D., that plaintiff was limited to light exertional work. *Id.* at 1085.  
11 The ALJ also found “significant inconsistencies between [plaintiff’s] report of pain and other  
12 evidence of record” and therefore found “the evidence does not support the degree of limitations  
13 alleged.” *Id.* In continuing through step seven, the ALJ assumed that plaintiff had no past relevant  
14 work. *Id.* at 1085 & n.1.

15 At step eight, the ALJ found that “[a]s of July 1, 2009, considering the claimant’s age,  
16 education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant was able to perform a  
17 significant number of jobs in the national economy (20 CFR 404.1560(c) and 404.1566).” *Id.* at  
18 1086. The ALJ found that as of July 1, 2009, plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations “had little or no  
19 effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels” and so a finding of “not  
20 disabled” was appropriate under the framework of section 204.00 in the Medical-Vocational  
21 Guidelines. *Id.* Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff’s disability ended as of July 1, 2009. *Id.*  
22

## 23 DISCUSSION

24 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, seeking a determination that the ALJ’s unfavorable  
25 decision is erroneous. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to discuss the 2006 CPD findings and her  
26 pain and fibromyalgia symptoms, and that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons  
27 for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff urges that this case be remanded solely for calculation  
28 of benefits or that her benefits be immediately reinstated if remand is for further proceedings.

1 Defendant also moves for summary judgment, arguing that the ALJ correctly found medical  
2 improvement, properly assessed the medical opinions, and gave valid reasons for discrediting  
3 plaintiff's testimony.

4

5 **I. Determination of Medical Improvement**

6 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's finding of medical improvement at step three is not  
7 supported by substantial evidence.<sup>6</sup> Pl.'s Mot. at 1, 10. Defendant asserts that "the ALJ properly  
8 found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments medically improved as of July 1, 2009."  
9 Def.'s Cross-Mot. at 5.

10

11 **A. Comparison of Medical Evidence from CPD with Current Medical Evidence**

12 The regulations define "medical improvement" as:

13 any decrease in the medical severity of your impairment(s) which was present at the  
14 time of the most recent favorable medical decision that you were disabled or  
15 continued to be disabled. A determination that there has been a decrease in medical  
severity must be based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs, and/or  
laboratory findings associated with your impairment(s) (see § 404.1528).

16 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1); *see also* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1) ("Medical improvement is any  
17 decrease in the medical severity of impairment(s) present at the time of the most recent favorable  
18 medical decision that you were disabled or continued to be disabled and is determined by a  
19 comparison of prior and current medial evidence which must show that there have been changes  
20 (improvement) in the symptoms, signs or laboratory findings associated with that impairment(s).").

21 In its prior order, this Court found legal error where the ALJ failed to cite to any medical  
22 evidence leading to the 2006 CPD and directed on remand that the ALJ compare the medical  
23 evidence at the time of the CPD with the post-CPD evidence. AR 1099-1110. In addition, since  
24 plaintiff's initial disability finding was based on depression and physical pain and the ALJ only

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26 <sup>6</sup> A heading in plaintiff's brief seems to allege that the ALJ erred in finding that the  
27 combination of her impairments did not meet any Listing. *See* Pl.'s Mot. at 10. In the paragraphs  
28 that follow, however, plaintiff makes no specific argument against this finding but focuses solely  
on the determination of medical improvement, an inquiry that applies only if a Listing is not met.  
The Court will not address findings that the plaintiff "failed to argue . . . with any specificity in [her]  
briefing." *See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).

1 addressed depression in that same decision, the Court also directed the ALJ to consider plaintiff's  
2 physical pain. *Id.* Plaintiff now alleges that the ALJ failed to comply with this Court's remand  
3 order by not sufficiently discussing the evidence at the CPD or discussing her physical pain at step  
4 three. Pl.'s Mot. at 1, 10, 14. Defendant argues that "the ALJ cited to medical evidence of  
5 depression, chronic pain, and fibromyalgia that pre-dated the October 2006 CPD and compared the  
6 prior and current medical evidence of these conditions in his decision (AR 1070-82, 1090-1106,  
7 1097-1100)." Def.'s Cross-Mot. at 8.

8 The Court agrees with defendant. In the October 2017 decision following remand, the ALJ  
9 first addressed the symptoms, signs, and/or laboratory findings related to the plaintiff's condition at  
10 the CPD and compared them with medical evidence after the CPD. AR 1073-82. The ALJ relied  
11 on a host of evidence before and at the time of the CPD, including the following: (1) plaintiff was  
12 prescribed Valium in 2005 due to stress caused by legal proceedings about her family; (2) on April  
13 27, 2005, Dr. Harry Fung, M.D., plaintiff's treating physician at Kaiser, restricted her from signing  
14 papers due to chronic pain from fibromyalgia and noted that she was tender to palpation at the neck,  
15 shoulders, upper and lower back, and hips; (3) on physical examination by treating physician Dr.  
16 Anastasia Cua, M.D., on October 13, 2005, supple neck with point tenderness at multiple areas was  
17 noted and straight leg raising was negative; (4) on April 26, 2006, Dr. Cua again noted point  
18 tenderness at multiple areas; (5) in the Function Reports plaintiff submitted in 2005 and 2006, she  
19 described the conditions and severity of her symptoms, including episodes of heart palpitation, the  
20 need to use crutches, and the inability to drive or leave home unaccompanied; and (6) consultative  
21 psychologist Dr. Sokley Khoi, Ph.D., examined plaintiff at the request of the SSA and concluded  
22 that plaintiff had marked impairment in tolerating the stress of a normal workday and in the ability  
23 to interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, and moderate to marked  
24 impairment in the ability to maintain adequate pace or persistence to perform complex tasks. *Id.* at  
25 1073-74.

26 The ALJ then addressed post-CPD medical evidence leading to the finding of medical  
27 improvement with respect to both depression and chronic pain. Regarding plaintiff's depression,  
28 the ALJ cited the following: (1) the medical record documented no stress caused by any legal

1 proceedings and no ongoing prescription for Valium; (2) non-psychiatric records from Kaiser  
2 described plaintiff's mental status as "within normal limits, with no suggestion that she had any  
3 impairment of any ability to perform basic mental work functions after July 1, 2009"; (3) Dr. Rana  
4 examined plaintiff on February 6, 2012, at the request of the SSA and noted a "clear sensorium,  
5 normal affect, normal speech and comprehension"; (4) Dr. Bodepudi examined plaintiff at the  
6 request of the SSA on February 9, 2012, and found that plaintiff had no marked impairment in  
7 numerous areas in which Dr. Khoi had found marked impairment in 2006; (5) subsequent medical  
8 records continued to document plaintiff's normal psychiatric status when plaintiff was seen for  
9 physical illnesses; and (6) other evidence of record, for example, that plaintiff was no longer  
10 housebound but made increased earnings for years after the CPD and was able to work in an office  
11 and use a computer as a ticket seller. *Id.* at 1075-77.

12 As to plaintiff's chronic pain, the ALJ compared the pre-CPD medical record with the post-  
13 CPD record and determined that the weight of the medical record established that plaintiff's  
14 condition had improved dramatically since the CPD because of: (1) medically documented  
15 improvement of plaintiff's ability to sign her name due to chronic pain; (2) resolution of her need  
16 to use crutches and a cane due to chronic pain; (3) resolution of her pre-CPD symptoms that  
17 allegedly caused an inability to drive, to walk more than half a block, and to engage in other activities  
18 of daily living; and (4) improvement of her neck and back pain as evidenced by the results of  
19 examinations that Dr. Cua, Dr. Rana, and treating physicians Dr. Ralph Koo, M.D., and Dr. Nusrat  
20 Chaudry, M.D., conducted respectively between 2010 and 2013. *Id.* at 1077-82.

21 The Court finds that by comparing the medical records before and after the CPD and by  
22 evaluating plaintiff's physical and mental conditions, the ALJ has corrected the legal error  
23 committed at step three in the previous decision.<sup>7</sup> The ALJ properly compared the medical evidence  
24 prior to and at the CPD with medical evidence after the CPD, and the finding of medical

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25  
26 <sup>7</sup> Plaintiff and defendant also dispute whether, according to the regulations, a finding that  
27 plaintiff no longer meets a Listing means that medical improvement has occurred per se. Pl.'s Mot.  
28 at 8-9; Def.'s Cross-Mot. at 6. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, and the Court need not  
resolve it here. As discussed above, *see n.6, supra*, plaintiff does not make any argument  
challenging the finding that her conditions no longer meet a Listing, and the Court has found that  
the ALJ made the requisite comparison of pre- and post-CPD medical evidence at step three.

1 improvement is supported by substantial evidence.

2

3       **B.     Timing of Medical Improvement**

4       The next question is whether substantial evidence supports the finding that there has been  
5 medical improvement in plaintiff's condition *as of July 1, 2009*. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's  
6 finding of medical improvement lacked substantial evidence because the ALJ referred to no medical  
7 records between July 1, 2009, and January 14, 2010, to support the medical improvement date and  
8 instead sought to support his "leap of faith" by relating evidence later than January 14, 2010, back  
9 to July 1, 2009. Pl.'s Mot. at 15-17. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not cite medical evidence  
10 from July 1, 2009, to January 14, 2010, because plaintiff did not seek treatment during that time.  
11 Def.'s Cross-Mot. at 6. Defendant also argues that the ALJ reasonably relied on later medical  
12 opinions in support of his medical improvement finding as of July 2009, and also that the ALJ  
13 supported the July 2009 date by citing to plaintiff's work history. *Id.* at 7-8.

14       The Court agrees with plaintiff that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's selection  
15 of July 1, 2009, as the date of medical improvement (and which therefore formed the basis for the  
16 conclusion that this was the date she was no longer disabled). The ALJ failed to explain what of  
17 significance occurred in July 2009. Rather than supporting this finding with substantial evidence,  
18 the ALJ's decision reads as if the ALJ first selected the July 1, 2009 cessation date and then worked  
19 backwards from there.

20       Although the ALJ mentioned in passing that plaintiff's benefits were terminated in July 2009  
21 due to work activity, *see AR 1065*, the ALJ did not cite this as the reason for finding medical  
22 improvement as of this date. Moreover, the ALJ noted elsewhere in the decision that in 2009  
23 plaintiff had monthly earnings *lower* than the amount that would give rise to a presumption of  
24 substantial gainful activity. And nowhere did the ALJ clarify whether or if plaintiff's earnings  
25 increased significantly in the month of July in particular. *See id.* at 1068.

26       Nor do the medical records show any improvement on July 1, 2009, specifically. Defendant  
27 does not dispute that there are no medical records between July 1, 2009, and January 14, 2010. In  
28 *Attmore v. Colvin*, 827 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision of an ALJ

1 who found that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits “was disabled as of April 15, 2007,  
2 but had medically improved to the point she was no longer disabled beginning on March 24, 2009.”  
3 *Attmore*, 827 F.3d at 874. Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately found that substantial evidence did  
4 not support the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement, it was at least clear how the ALJ had reached  
5 the March 24, 2009 cessation date. The medical record contained a note from the claimant’s treating  
6 psychiatrist dated March 23, 2009, stating that the claimant was “feeling pretty well” with “no  
7 specific complaints.” *Id.* In the decision finding that disability ended as of March 24, 2009, “the  
8 ALJ described in detail Attmore’s symptoms as of March 24 and pointed to evidence indicating that  
9 she had ‘shown improvement in the area of social functioning.’” *Id.* at 877. Here, by contrast, the  
10 ALJ’s decision contains no such explanation of what occurred on July 1, 2009, to render plaintiff  
11 no longer disabled, nor does the ALJ point to any medical records from this date.

12 It is further worth noting that when plaintiff first applied for reinstatement of benefits, the  
13 SSA determined she was no longer disabled as of March 1, 2012. AR 1065. When she filed for  
14 reconsideration, the SSA determined she was no longer disabled as of October 1, 2011. *Id.* And  
15 when plaintiff again challenged that decision by requesting a hearing before the ALJ, the ALJ  
16 concluded she was no longer disabled as of July 1, 2009. *Id.* That the SSA reached three different  
17 disability cessation dates, each one earlier than what the SSA previously found, is further reason  
18 why the Court finds the ALJ should have provided an explanation of why he found plaintiff no  
19 longer disabled *as of July 1, 2009*.

20 Accordingly, the Court finds the disability cessation date of July 1, 2009, is not supported  
21 by substantial evidence and REMANDS this case for the ALJ to reevaluate the cessation date and  
22 to support that date with citations to substantial evidence in the record.

23  
24 **II. Other Contentions**

25 The parties’ remaining disputes focus on the ALJ’s findings regarding plaintiff’s residual  
26 functional capacity at step seven and the application of the grids at step eight. As noted above, the  
27 ALJ need not have reached these steps after finding at step six that plaintiff did not have a severe  
28 impairment as of July 1, 2009. *See* AR 1082; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(6) (stating that if the

1 claimant's current impairments in combination are not severe in nature, then the claimant "will no  
2 longer be considered to be disabled"). The Court will therefore address the arguments challenging  
3 steps seven and eight only briefly. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds no error in the  
4 weight assigned Dr. Rana's opinion or in the discrediting of plaintiff's testimony.

5

6 **A. Assessment of Medical Opinion of Dr. Rana**

7 Plaintiff's main contention is that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Rana's finding of  
8 limitations from her fibromyalgia. Pl.'s Mot. at 12. If the ALJ had properly credited Dr. Rana's  
9 finding and limited plaintiff to light exertional work, plaintiff argues, then the ALJ would have been  
10 required to find plaintiff disabled.

11 On February 6, 2012, Dr. Rana examined plaintiff at the request of the SSA. Dr. Rana noted  
12 that plaintiff had "tender points all over" with a history of fibromyalgia and SVT and concluded that  
13 plaintiff was limited to light exertional work. AR 815-17. The ALJ accorded little weight to this  
14 opinion for several reasons. First, he explained, "Dr. Rana's report does not suggest that she  
15 reviewed the records of other health care providers, or that she reviewed Exhibit B17D, which  
16 documents that the claimant earned over \$10,000 in 2011. . . . To the extent Dr. Rana's opinions  
17 concerning the claimant's functional limitations were based on what the claimant told her regarding  
18 pain symptoms, those opinions are undermined if what the claimant told Dr. Rana was not accurate  
19 or incomplete, whether in reporting the extent and nature of, or restrictions on, her activities of daily  
20 living, or in reporting the location and severity of pain symptoms." *Id.* at 1085. For instance, the  
21 ALJ noted that Dr. Rana's report states that plaintiff "cannot do much around the house. She just  
22 microwaves her food" but omits any mention that plaintiff was working part-time outside the home  
23 as a ticket seller. *See id.* Moreover, Dr. Rana's examination was the only one noting multiple tender  
24 points in the last several years, which was inconsistent with other post-CPD medical records,  
25 including the records of medical professionals who examined plaintiff multiple times between 2010  
26 and 2013 and noted no tender points. *Id.* at 1085.

27 As a threshold matter, plaintiff misapprehends several issues in her brief. First, she  
28 repeatedly argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Rana's "diagnosis" of fibromyalgia. Yet

1 Dr. Rana only went so far as to state that plaintiff “complained of” and had a “history of”  
2 fibromyalgia. *See id.* at 815-17. Moreover, the ALJ did not disbelieve that plaintiff has a history  
3 of fibromyalgia; what the ALJ discredited was Dr. Rana’s conclusion that plaintiff was limited to  
4 light work. Second, plaintiff erroneously argues that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Rana’s opinion  
5 required support by clear and convincing reasons. *See* Pl.’s Mot. at 13-14. This standard applies  
6 where an ALJ rejects the *uncontradicted* opinion of a treating or examining doctor. *See Ryan v.*  
7 *Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If a treating or  
8 examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it  
9 by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” *Id.*  
10 (citation omitted). Here, Dr. Rana’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion; for  
11 instance, Dr. Collman testified at the July 2014 hearing that plaintiff had no exertional limitations.  
12 *See* AR 1084. Therefore, in order to reject Dr. Rana’s opinion, the ALJ needed to provide specific  
13 and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

14 The Court finds that the ALJ did so here. To determine how much weight to give to a  
15 physician’s opinion, the ALJ may consider, among other things, the type of relationship (examining,  
16 treating, etc.), the extent to which the opinion is supported by evidence such as medical signs and  
17 laboratory findings, the consistency with the record as a whole, and the doctor’s area of  
18 specialization. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (evaluating opinion evidence for claims filed before  
19 March 27, 2017); *see also Revels v. Berryhill*, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ explained  
20 that Dr. Rana only examined plaintiff once and noted that Dr. Rana was the only doctor in the years  
21 surrounding 2012 to find plaintiff had multiple tender points. *See* AR 1085; *see also* AR 844, 882,  
22 904, 912, 924, 1029. The ALJ also properly noted that Dr. Rana’s opinion did not suggest that she  
23 reviewed other medical records but relied solely on plaintiff’s self-reporting, which appeared to omit  
24 important information about plaintiff’s work outside the home. These constitute specific and  
25 legitimate reasons for according little weight to Dr. Rana’s opinion when considering plaintiff’s  
26 residual function capacity at step seven.

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1           **B. Plaintiff's Discredited Testimony**

2           Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ "failed to properly evaluate [plaintiff's] subjective  
3           complaints of pain and depression on her ability to work" and thus erred in discrediting her  
4           testimony. Pl.'s Mot. at 18.

5           An ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a claimant regarding  
6           subjective symptoms. *Vasquez v. Astrue*, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, "the  
7           ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an  
8           underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms  
9           alleged." *Lingenfelter*, 504 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Second,  
10          if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, 'the ALJ can reject the  
11          claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and  
12          convincing reasons for doing so.'" *Id.* (quoting *Smolen v. Chater*, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.  
13          1996)). "This is not an easy requirement to meet: 'The clear and convincing standard is the most  
14          demanding required in Social Security cases.'" *Garrison*, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting *Moore v.*  
15          *Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).

16          Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff met the first step of the credibility test but went on to find  
17          that her "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms  
18          after the CPD are at times internally inconsistent, and [are] inconsistent with other evidence of  
19          record." AR 1084. The ALJ stated the following reasons for discrediting plaintiff's testimony about  
20          her symptoms of pain and limitations: (1) plaintiff mentioned nothing about her work as a ticket  
21          seller in her 2011 Function Reports, in which she was asked to list the places she went on a regular  
22          basis, and failed to disclose she had been able to get of the house enough to work and earn over  
23          \$10,000 per year since 2007; (2) she claimed that she could not leave home alone but she routinely  
24          went to Kaiser alone, either walking in or arriving via car by herself; (3) although she claimed she  
25          had sciatica, there was no confirmation of it in the medical record and straight leg raising tests were  
26          negative; (4) she claimed that she had episodes of tachycardia approximately once a month that  
27          lasted about two to three hours but there was no confirmation of it from any objective medical  
28          source; (5) she claimed that she once went to Kaiser in Richmond where they "paused her heart"

1 and that later she went to Kaiser in Oakland telling them not to “pause” her heart and threatening to  
2 walk out, but there was no documentation of that as well; and (6) she “has not provided the names  
3 of any medical providers from whom she has sought treatment for tachycardia since 2013, and in  
4 2013 she reported to a medical provider that she had not been seen for this condition since 2011,  
5 raising questions about the accuracy of her reports.” *Id.* at 1083-84.

6 In contrast to the ALJ’s September 2014 decision, in this most recent decision the ALJ  
7 provided lengthy and coherent reasons with citations to the record to show how plaintiff’s pain  
8 testimony conflicted with the medical evidence. In other words, the Court finds that the ALJ  
9 provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting plaintiff’s  
10 symptom testimony. These reasons include the contradictions between plaintiff’s reported daily  
11 activity level and her work activity and the inconsistency in her reports of tachycardia. In her  
12 motion, plaintiff does not challenge any of the specific reasons that the ALJ cited. *See* Pl.’s Mot. at  
13 18-21. Rather, plaintiff chiefly contends that the ALJ failed to discuss plaintiff’s statements of pain  
14 and fibromyalgia symptoms and made conclusory findings of inconsistencies between her reports  
15 of pain and other evidence of record. *Id.* at 20-21. Defendant argues that plaintiff mischaracterized  
16 the ALJ’s decision, and the Court agrees. *See* Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 21. In particular, earlier in the  
17 decision the ALJ extensively addressed plaintiff’s pain and fibromyalgia. *See* AR 1077-82.

18 Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the weight the ALJ accorded to plaintiff’s symptom  
19 testimony.

20  
21       **C. Application of the Grids**

22 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines  
23 (“the grids”) in finding that plaintiff was not disabled. Pl.’s Mot. at 17-18; 20 C.F.R. Part 404,  
24 Subpt. P, App. 2. This argument is premised on crediting Dr. Rana’s light work opinion as true.  
25 *See* Pl.’s Mot. at 17-18. Because the Court has found above that the ALJ did not err in according  
26 little weight to Dr. Rana’s opinion, the Court will not address plaintiff’s argument further here.

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1           **III. Relief Sought**

2           Plaintiff states that because this is a continuing disability review case, if the Court remands  
3           the case for further proceedings, then it must also order reinstatement of her benefits pending those  
4           proceedings. *Id.* at 21-23. Plaintiff relies on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1597a(i)(6), which governs  
5           “Continued benefits pending appeal of a medical cessation determination.” Plaintiff also cites to a  
6           Tenth Circuit case and an unpublished case from this district, both of which ordered continued  
7           payment of benefits pending remand after the courts vacated and reversed decisions by the ALJ to  
8           terminate disability benefits. *See* Pl.’s Mot. at 22-23 (citing *Hayden v. Barnhart*, 374 F.3d 986, 994  
9           (10th Cir. 2004); *Granillo v. Colvin*, No. 14-cv-4658-JCS, 2016 WL 4411811, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. Aug.  
10           19, 2016)).

11           The posture of this case is somewhat unusual, in that here plaintiff’s benefits did not  
12           originally end due to a medical cessation determination. Rather, unlike the claimants in *Hayden* and  
13           *Granillo*, plaintiff’s benefits ceased due to work activity. *See* AR 1065. Plaintiff applied for and  
14           received expedited reinstatement of benefits, *see id.* at 514, a process which is available for  
15           claimants to regain entitlement to benefits when the SSA previously terminated disability benefits  
16           due to work activity. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592b. And as defendant notes, Social Security  
17           regulations preclude a claimant from receiving expedited reinstatement of benefits a second time  
18           where a claimant previously received provisional benefits for the same previous disability  
19           entitlement. *See* Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592e(b)).

20           Under the circumstances presented here, and in light of the limited scope of remand outlined  
21           in this Order, the Court will not order reinstatement of benefits pending further proceedings.

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## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. This case is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Order, in order for the ALJ to reevaluate the disability cessation date.

## **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

Dated: August 19, 2019

Susan Blston

**SUSAN ILLSTON**  
United States District Judge